“Either God exists or he does not exist. Reason is powerless to decide the question. All I can do is to weigh the chances for and against. It is, as it were, a game of pitch and toss. On which side shall I wager?
But why wager at all? What necessity is there to run this strange chance? Can I not put away from me this problem whose solution either way is sure to leave me disturbed and ill content? I cannot. My every action, every movement of my will, implies a certain solution of this unique problem. It is not with the existence of God as with questions of science, which do not affect me personally. It is quite evident that I must act differently according as God exists or not. So I am bound to wager. There is no choice in the matter. We have committed ourselves. Now to examine the conditions of the wager.
In this hazard, as in every other, there are two things to be considered: the degree of probability and the amount of risk. The question of the existence of God being infinitely beyond the scope of reason, the probability is the same for the affirmative as for the negative. This term then is cancelled. There remains the risk. On the one hand there is the finite to be ventured, on the other hand the infinite to be gained. Now, however great may be the finite, it becomes as nothing before the infinite. Strictly speaking then, it becomes a question of venturing the infinitely little in order to gain the infinitely great. Hence we are clearly bound to wager in favour of the existence of God. The reasoning is conclusive. If I am capable of discerning any truth, this is one.”
Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), Emile Boutroux Pascal (Manchester: Sherrat and Hughes, 1902) 69-70.